for their essential computers are often very high. The most frequently quoted requirement is probably that of less than loo* "catastrophic failure conditions" per hour of operation (excluding software faults) in civil transport airplanes [9] . In the U.S.
Federal Aviation Administration's Advanced Automation System (for air traffic control), one of the key computer systems has a required total unavailability of less than 10~', or 3 seconds per year. A safety-critical processor for urban trains must fail with a probability of less than 1O-'2 per hour. We are talking about levels that arc unusually high, and obviously very difficult to achieve and we shall call these levels of depenm dability "ultrahigh" for brevity.
The main problem with achieving such levels of dependability is the possibility of subtle design faults. This problem is common to all cornplex systems, hut the prevalence of software technology for the production of very complex, digital systems has made it predominantly felt in the software field. Most of the following discussion, therefore, refers directly to software, although it is applicable in a more general scope.
Software dependability is well known to be a serious problem. Whereas a mechanical engineer can to zome degree determine a part's reliability (within a certain range of technologically feasible values) whilr designing it, by setting design and manufacturing parameters, a software designer (and therefore any designer of computer-based systems) has very little ability to plan the dependability of a product. Among the reasons for this are: 1) software failures are due to design faults, which are difficult both to avoid and to tolerate; 2) software is often used to implement radically new systems, which cannot benefit much from knowledge acquired tram previous, successful designs; and 3) digital systems in general implement discontinuous input-to-output mappings that are intractable by simple mathematical modeling. This last point is particularly important:
continuity assumptions cannot be used in validating software, and failures are caused by the occurrence of specific, nonobvious combinatiom of events, rather than from excessive levels of some ident&ble stress factor. Given this common unsatisfactor) state of the art, adding the requirement of drpendability levels that arc at the boundary of what is known to be attainable, or beyond, evidently creates a very serious problem.
These ultrahigh levels of dependability would also be difficult to attaio in a system built purely in hardware. It ia true that we now have means of capturing the statistical properties of component lifetimes, and the effect that component unreliability has on overall system reliability. We know how to employ simple redundancy schemes to obtain high overall sysren~ reliability from relatively unreliable components.
However, these meth~ nds ignore the effects of design faults. Thus the "solution" we sometimes hear to the software problem-"build it in hardware instead"-ia usually no solution at all. The problem of design dependability arises because the complexity of the sys~ terns is so great we cannot simply postulate the absence of design
